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$EVWUDFW
Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will change the energy markets. The resulting price
shifts will represent important terms-of-trade changes. The paper explores how the different
countries’ relationship to the fossil fuel markets will cause variations in the costs from
implementation of Kyoto Protocol.  The paper furthermore analyses how the geographical
distribution of abatement efforts will be altered if emission trading is allowed.
According to the presented analysis Russia and the other economies in transition to a market
economy (EIT-countries) will experience net gains from implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol. An important prerequisite is however, that emission trading takes place without
restrictions. The USA is a likely dominant quota buyer. This quota import gives nevertheless
surprisingly small net cost reductions. The inclusion of benefits from revenue recycling, so-
called double dividends, is an explanatory factor at this point. These benefits are probably
important for the different countries’ choice between quota trade and domestic abatement
measures.
$NQRZOHGJHPHQW
I gratefully acknowledge comments to earlier drafts from Knut H. Alfsen, Cathrine Hagem,
Asbjørn Torvanger and Asbjørn Aaheim.
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
The Kyoto Protocol commits the Annex B countries to reduce their emissions of CO2 and
other greenhouse gases (GHGs). The purpose of this paper is to explore how some essential
differences in starting points across the Annex B countries might cause considerable
differences in the costs of achieving the commitments specified in the Kyoto Protocol. 1 The
paper analyses how the distribution of costs could be altered if emission trading between
countries is allowed, and how this trade might change the geographical distribution of
abatement efforts.
The roles of the fossil fuel markets are pivotal for the present analysis. Because CO2 is the
most important GHG and because emissions of CO2 mainly are attached to combustion of
fossil fuels, implementation of the Kyoto Protocol will directly affect the demand for these
fuels. Hence, the fossil fuel markets will be moved to a new equilibrium. The resulting price
changes are likely to bring about terms-of-trade changes of considerable importance for
several countries.
In this paper we apply ACT, a numerical model developed at Center for International Climate
and Environmental Research in Oslo (CICERO).2 The core of the model and its theoretical
background are described in detail in Holtsmark (1998).3 Basic in ACT are regional and
global fossil fuel markets which determine the fossil fuel prices. The oil and coal markets are
assumed to be global, while three regional natural gas markets are built into the model. One
gas market is in North America, where both the USA and Canada are producers of gas with a
net export of gas from Canada to USA taking place. Russia and Europe are included in a
second gas market. The third gas market is found in the East-Asian/Pacific region.
National income indicators are linked to each other through the fossil fuel markets and the
market for tradable quotas. The policies, which are assumed to be implementation of
emission taxes, will affect the collection of public revenue in the different countries.4 The
revenue could be ‘recycled’ into the private sector by reducing existing distortionary taxes.
The implementation of the Kyoto Protocol could in other words be part of or generate a
‘green’ tax reform. Possible benefits from such a reform (double dividends) are taken into
account in the numerical analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview of the numerical model
ACT. The third section describes how behavior is modeled, while section 4 discusses shortly
some limitations and advantages of the model. A box within section 4 provides a less
mathematical description of ACT. Section 5 presents how the abatement costs of the Annex B
countries. Sections 6 presents possible consequences of the Kyoto Protocol, especially how
                                                          
1
 The countries listed in Annex B in the Kyoto Protocol, which are the industrialised countries.
2
 ACT is an abbreviation for Achieving Commitments by Trading
3
 Cf. also Ringius, Torvanger and Holtsmark (1998) which applies a less aggregated version of the model.
4
 A domestic system of auctioned tradable permits is likely to have mainly the same effects on public revenue,
income distribution and resource allocation as a system with emission taxes. Although we discuss as if emission
taxes are implemented, the results are also applicable for countries using auctioned tradable permits instead. If,
however, the permits are distributed without charge to the emitters the generated public revenue is reduced
compared to the taxation case. No public revenue is then available for recycling, i.e. existing taxrates could not
to the same extent be reduced. Free distribution of tradable permits curtails consequently the possibility for
taking benefit of an economic efficiency gain through the reduction in excisting tax rates.
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emission trading will redistribute abatement efforts and costs and alter the prices in the fossil
fuel markets.
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 7KHJHQHUDOIUDPHZRUNRI$&7
ACT consists of a set of national income indicators or functions, one for each country or
group of country.5 These functions consist of five elements:
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• \Q, \Q and \Q are oil, coal and gas consumption in country Qrespectively. The unit of
measurement is related to the carbon-content of the fuels.
• [Q, [Q and [Q are indigenous oil, coal and gas production in country Qrespectively.
• \Q is emissions of CH4, N2O, and the industrial gases measured in CO2-equivalents.
• S, S and S are the prices in the oil, coal and gas markets respectively. Because there are
three regional gas markets there are three different gas prices as well. For purpose of
exposition we ignore that here.
• S4 is the quota price.
• (Qis the emissions of GHGs in country Q
• 4Q is the quota.
• PQ is the marginal excess burden of taxation in country Q
• 5&Q is the total amount of public revenue generated by taxation of fossil fuels and GHG
emissions plus the revenue generated by quota sales, eventually minus the public
expenditure related to quota purchase.
The first element in the welfare function is a subfunction measuring value added and
consumers’ surplus brought about by domestic use of fossil fuels and emissions of CH4, N2O,
and the industrial gases. Secondly, we subtract the costs related to the indigenous production
of fossil fuels (if any). The third element represents the net import bill for fossil fuels. Fourth,
we include the net bill for quota purchase. Finally, we include an element, which incorporates
the tax recycling benefit (the double dividend). The size of this element is a linearly
increasing function of the sum of the amount of public revenue generated by taxation of GHG
emissions and the net amount of public revenue generated by quota sales to other countries.
When we assume the existence of ’benefits from revenue recycling’ we only claim that there
is a “weak double dividend” in the terms of Goulder (1995). There is a weak double dividend
simply when there are benefits from using the extra government revenue generated by the
introduction of GHG emission taxes to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes. The existence
of weak double dividend is easily defended on theoretical grounds and receives wide support
from several numerical calculations, cf. Hoel (1998) and Bohm (1998).
There is a so-called ‘strong double dividend’ from implementation of environmental taxes
when these taxes give rice to welfare improvements even without counting for environmental
                                                          
5
 The elements measuring value added and the elements measuring production costs are specified with quadratic
functions giving rice to linear demand and supply functions. The oil production costs within OPEC are however
assumed to be constant at a level equal to 2.30 USD pr. tonnes CO2.
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gains. The existence of “strong double dividend” is on the other hand more controversial and
not included in ACT. The earlier version of ACT presented in Holtsmark (1997) includes
“strong double dividend”.
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 %HKDYLRU
The private non-fossil-fuel-producing sector in each country maximizes the first term in the
national welfare function with respect to \Q, \Q, \Q and \Q. We could define a welfare
function for this sector as follows:
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• WLQ is tax on fossil fuels in the reference case.
• W&Q is a GHG emission tax in country Q
The producers of fossil fuels behave as price takers and maximize their profit. There is
however one exception: OPEC is considered as an oil producer who maximizes its profit
taking into account the relationship between the market price and its own production.  The
profit functions for the other fossil fuel producers are:
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The governments, on the other hand, maximize their national welfare functions as defined
above. Their only policy instrument in this maximization is the emission tax W&Q. The national
welfare functions are consequently:
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 /LPLWDWLRQVDQGDGYDQWDJHVRIWKHPRGHOFRQFHSW
Due to the formulation of ACT, the structures of the countries’ energy demand, prior tax
distortions and the size of the marginal excess burden of taxation in the different countries are
important factors behind the models' estimates of the simultaneous abatement costs. The
presented numerical examples illustrate how the distribution of gains and losses among the
Annex B parties are sensitive to the different countries’ links to the fossil fuel markets and
their current and potential fossil fuel taxation schemes.
It should, however, be emphasized that ACT is a partial and static model, and that damage
costs from climate change are not included in the concept. Dynamic aspects of the countries'
climate policies, as emphasized by for example Nordhaus and Yang (1996), are for example
not taken into account in the present analysis. Costs in relation to movement from one
equilibrium to another are furthermore ignored.
Some relevant structural characteristics of the national economies that are emphasized by
other studies, as for example DFAT and ABARE (1995) and Burniaux et al. (1992), are only
partly incorporated. In contrast to the mentioned studies the present study analyses, however,
in further detail the countries' fossil fuel taxation policies under the implementation of the
Kyoto protocol, and to what extent these taxation policies influence the distribution of costs
and benefits of an agreement. Unlike the mentioned studies, the present study directs the
focus towards the links between a possible climate agreement and both the current and
potential fossil fuel taxation policies in the light of public budget constraints. 6
                                                          
6
 Although there is a vast amount of literature on the costs of combating greenhouse gas emissions, a large part
of the literature is focused only on the measurement of the direct abatement costs. Surprisingly, most of the
studies take into account neither the gains from revenue recycling nor the benefits or losses from changes in
terms-of-trade (cf. Ekins (1995) and Hoeller and Wallin (1991)). Some examples of model studies taking terms-
of-trade effects into account are Burniaux et al. (1992), DFAT and ABARE (1995). None of these studies
analyze the benefits of revenue recycling. Several other studies, for example Jorgensen and Wilcoxen (1993),
emphasize on the other hand the importance of taking revenue recycling into account, but ignore the terms-of-
trade effects of several countries implementing climate policies at the same time. The contribution of our
analysis is to give some indications on how the costs of the Kyoto Protocol will vary among the Annex B
countries when dead-weight-loss from taxation, gains from revenue recycling and terms-of-trade effects are
taken into account. This is done while taking into account the effect of all the Annex B countries implementing
efficient abatement measures at the same time.
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$&7$FKLHYLQJ&RPPLWPHQWVE\7UDGLQJ
A model for analysis of economic consequences of the Kyoto Protocol
• ACT is a WRSGRZQmodel.
• ACT includes all gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol.
• The Annex B countries maximise country specific welfare functions subject to national
GHG-emission constraints and public budget constraints. The national welfare functions
are linked to each other through the global and regional fossil fuel markets and the quota
market.
• The national welfare functions include five elements:
a) value added and consumers’ surplus from both private and public sector consumption
of oil, coal and gas and emissions of other  GHGs
b) profit in indigenous production of fossil fuels
c) costs related to fossil fuel import
d) net income from quota sales
e) benefits from recycling the revenues collected by fossil fuel taxation and net income
from quota sales, i.e. weak double dividend.
• The national abatement costs are equal to the reduction in consumers’ surplus and value
added from fossil fuel consumption and emissions of the other GHGs minus the benefits
from revenue recycling. The different national fossil fuel consumption patterns together
with the size of the fossil fuel taxes in 1990 are the main factors behind the estimated
abatement cost functions for CO2 in the different countries and regions. The higher was
the share of coal in countries’ total fossil fuel consumption in 1990, the lower are
(broadly speaking) the estimated abatement costs. Concerning the non-CO2 gases
abatement cost patterns are assumed to be the same in different regions and countries.
• The assumed size of the marginal excess burden of taxation (MEB), which is equal to the
marginal cost of public funds minus one, is basic when the benefits from revenue
recycling is calculated. The MEBs are calibrated to the values that imply that zero GHG
emission taxes are optimal as long as the countries are not subject to emission constraints
nor experience any environmental benefits from GHG abatement. The MEB is 0.04 in
USA and Japan, 0.08 in EU and in Canada, 0.02 in Australia, 0.09 in Norway and 0.11 in
other OECD-countries, and zero in the EIT-countries.
• The governments are assumed to use fossil fuel taxes on consumption as their climate
policy instrument. The results could however also be interpreted as if the governments
use auctioned tradable permit systems.
• The supply in the oil market is modelled with OPEC as a dominant supplier behaving
strategically, while the rest of the oil supply is a ‘competitive fringe’ with supply
elasticity of 0.75. There are also a global market for coal and three regional markets for
gas with endogenous prices. These four markets are assumed to be competitive. Supply
elasticities are 0.75 in the gas markets and 1.0 in the coal market.
The direct demand price elasticities vary between -0.21 (oil in Finland) and -0.57 (gas in
the EIT-countries). The demand cross price elasticities varies between 0.0 and 0.30.
• In the cases where emission trading is allowed a competitive quota market is also included.
The quota price is endogenous and secures equilibrium in the market.
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 $EDWHPHQWFRVWV
The purpose of the presented model simulations is firstly to give an idea of how emission
trading within different frameworks could alter the countries total costs, both the direct
abatement costs and secondary costs (and benefits) related to terms of trade changes etc.
Secondly, we also want to provide some information on possible absolute levels of the costs.
Although the numerical examples are useful to both these purposes, one should be careful
when interpreting the results. It is important to underline that not least the absolute level of
the different countries calculated abatement costs are difficult to predict, especially when we
look several years into the future. The absolute level of the abatement costs will for example
depend on the technological possibilities for switching to new renewable energy sources at
the actual point in time. The economic costs connected to new renewable energy are changing
rapidly and are therefore hard to predict without a considerable degree of uncertainty when
we look forward to the first commitment period (2008-2012).
In this study we use ACT to give us information about annual abatement costs in the first
commitment period. Technological development is likely to reduce the abatement costs
before these points in time are reached. Other changes in the world economy might also
adjust the costs. Although we are fully aware of the likeliness of such changes to take place
we have not incorporated such a technological development. Hence, from that point of view
there is a danger that ACT in general exaggerates the abatement costs in 2010.
Figure 1 presents the models estimates of the marginal abatement costs of reducing emissions
of GHGs.7 Sweden’s rapidly increasing marginal abatement costs are explained by the
relatively high fossil fuel taxes in this country (in 1990) and the low consumption of coal and
reflects furthermore the fact that electricity is produced almost without use of fossil fuels in
Sweden.
The high abatement costs in Norway can be explained by similar reasons. The somewhat
lower average fossil fuel taxes in Norway (in 1990) explain why the estimated marginal
abatement costs are lower in Norway compared to Sweden.
ACT estimates the marginal abatement costs in Denmark to be higher than in Finland,
although Denmark uses coal intensively, not least in power production. The explanation is
connected to the structure and level of fossil fuel taxes in these countries in 1990. The fossil
fuel taxes in Denmark were relatively high and are assumed to have led to relatively efficient
use of fossil fuels. 8 The average oil tax in Finland was, on the other hand, in 1990 at a level
equal to about 50% of the average oil tax in Denmark in that year, cf. appendix A.
                                                          
7
 The abatement cost functions presented here are different from those presented in Holtsmark and Hagem
(1998). This is due to the choice of estimates for the marginal excess burden of taxation (the MEBs).  In the
model version applied in the present paper the MEBs are calibrated to values that imply that zero GHG emission
taxes are optimal as long as the countries are not subject to emission constraints nor experience any
environmental benefits from GHG abatement. With this calibration method the possibilities for ’strong double
dividend’ are ruled out. Cf. the box below.
8
 This argument is based on the assumption that high fossil fuel taxes leads to high costs of curbing CO2-
emissions further. It is reasonable to assume that the tax already has caused an efficient use of fossil fuel. Hence,
low-cost options for reduced consumption of the fuels are already exploited.
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)LJXUH(VWLPDWHGPDUJLQDODEDWHPHQWFRVWV86'SUWRQQHV&2HTXLYDOHQWRI
UHGXFLQJHPLVVLRQVRI*+*V%HQHILWVIURPUHYHQXHUHF\FOLQJDUHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW
EXWWHUPVRIWUDGHFKDQJHVDUHQRW
The marginal abatement costs in Japan increase relatively fast. This is explained by among
other factors the assumed somewhat inelastic demand for fossil fuels in Japan. EU has
implemented considerable higher oil taxes than the USA and Canada. That should lead to
higher abatement costs in Europe. However, the intensive use of coal in Europe draws in the
other direction. Hence, the model finds that the abatement costs are relatively similar in
Europe and the USA and Canada.
Figure 2 shows the models estimated WRWDO cost curves for the different countries and groups
of countries before terms of trade-changes are taken into account. The costs are measured as
income loss in percentage of the GDP in 1990. The double dividends, i.e. benefits from
revenue recycling are included. These cost curves capture that the use of emission taxes will
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generate public revenue, which could be reimbursed to the private sector. It is assumed that
the reimbursement implies reduction of other taxes. Reduced tax rates will in general increase
the efficiency of the economies and hence adjust the net cost curves downwards.
)LJXUH(VWLPDWHGDEDWHPHQWFRVWV7HUPVRIWUDGHFKDQJHVDUHQRWWDNHQLQWR
DFFRXQWEXWWKHEHQHILWVIURPUHYHQXHUHF\FOLQJDUHLQFOXGHG
In order to understand the differences between the cost curves in figure 1 (marginal costs in
USD pr. tonnes CO2 equivalents) and figure 2 (total costs in percentage of GDP) we should
keep in mind that in figure 1, we measure absolute costs along the vertical axes, while we
measure the total costs relative to the countries’ respective GDP in along the vertical axes in
figure 2.
7RWDODEDWHPHQWFRVWVEHIRUHWHUPVRIWUDGHFKDQJHV
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The change from absolute costs to costs in relation to GDP explains also to a large part why
the cost curve of the USA now is elevated compared to the cost curve of EU, while it was
slightly below in Figure 1 which measured marginal costs in absolute terms.
From figure 2 we see that the cost curves all start at origo. This is a result of the calibration
method for parameters representing the marginal excess burdens of taxation, se the box above
with some key features of ACT. Due to this calibration method we rule out  ‘no regret’
options or so-called ‘strong double dividend”. The cost curves would, however, be steeper if
we had not included benefits from revenue recycling, i.e. weak double dividend.
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 6RPHSRVVLEOHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKH.\RWR3URWRFRO
By the us of the numerical model ACT presented in the previous sections, this section
presents numerical examples in order to illustrate some economic consequences of the Kyoto
Protocol and especially how transboundary emission trading between countries will alter the
distribution of costs. The numerical examples will furthermore provide some ideas of which
countries are likely sellers and buyers in the quota market and a likely level of the quota price.
7DEOH%$8HPLVVLRQVRI&2PLOOLRQWRQQHVDQGRWKHUJUHHQKRXVHJDVHV2*+*
PLOOLRQWRQQHVRI&2HTXLYDOHQWVLQDQGWKH.\RWRTXRWDVDQGWKHHPLVVLRQ
UHGXFWLRQFRPPLWPHQWV
Emissions
1990
 CO2
Emissions
1990
 OGHG
Sum
emissions
1990
BAU
Emissions
2010
 CO2
BAU
Emissions
2010
OGHG
Sum 2010
BAU
emissions
Quota Reduction
commit-
ment
USA 4957.0 784.0 5741.1 6097.1 720.6 6817.7 5339.2 1478.5
Canada 462.6 103.1 565.8 550.5 110.1 660.7 531.8 128.8
EU12* 3121.5 749.9 3871.4 3304.6 592.8 3897.4 3581.4 316.0
Denmark 60.2** 19.6 79.8 66.0 17.6 83.6 63.0 20.5
Finland 53.9 10.9 64.8 63.3 12.0 75.3 64.8 10.5
Sweden 61.3 11.2 72.4 72.3 12.4 84.7 75.3 9.4
Norway 35.5 18.6 54.1 49.0 15.5 64.5 54.6 9.9
Other OECD 47.2 12.9 60.2 46.7 11.2 57.8 55.9 1.9
Russia 2388.7 594.8 2983.5 2221.5 594.8 2816.3 2983.5 0.0
Other EIT 1690.9 428.5 2065.4 1711.8 317.7 2029.5 1968.7 60.8
Australia/N.Z. 314.4 202.2 516.7 402.3 179.3 581.5 552.1 29.4
Japan 1155.0 46.1 1201.1 1325.9 41.5 1367.5 1129.1 238.4
Sum 14348.3 2981.9 17276.2 15911.1 2625.4 18536.5 16399.5 2304.2
* EU-15 minus Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
** Adjusted to account for import and export of electricity and variations in temperature. The actual emissions
were 52.3 mill. tonnes CO2.
When the countries are free to buy or sell parts of their emission quotas in a market, they are
assumed to reduce their domestic emission to the level where the marginal abatement costs
are equal to the quota price. Hence, in the case with free emission trading marginal abatement
costs are equal both across gases and countries and equal to the quota price.
It is important to underline that the numerical examples do not take into account that the
Kyoto Protocol states that quota import should be supplemental to domestic abatement
efforts. In the actual model framework the governments simply minimize their costs, and do
not take any environmental considerations into account. It should furthermore be noticed that
the possibility for joint implementation projects and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
and its influence on the quota market is not taken into consideration here. If, however,
emission rights could be achieved through CDM, this could constitute a ceiling for the quota
price.
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Annex B in the protocol specifies flat rate emission reductions within the European Union
member countries. However, in accordance with article 4 the EU member countries are free to
redistribute the commitments between them selves. In the presented numerical examples the
internal EU-distribution agreed upon in June 1998 is therefore used as our starting point. That
means for example that Denmark is assumed to reduce its emissions by 21% below the 1990
level, Finland must return to the 1990-emission while Sweden is allowed to increase the
emissions by 4%. The Nordic EU-countries are treated separately, while the model aggregates
rest of the EU-countries to one unit (labeled EU12 in the tables).
The assumptions about the countries’ BAU emissions in 2010 are based on emission
scenarios presented in national communications when this is possible. Some reported
emission scenarios appear however unrealistically low. The BAU emissions of these
countries are therefore adjusted upwards to what we se as a more realistic level, cf. 7DEOH1.
Where the emission scenarios are not presented in national communications, the assumed
BAU-emissions are taken from Alfsen, Holtsmark and Torvanger (1998).
7DEOH$EDWHPHQWRI&2DQGRWKHUJUHHQKRXVHJDVHV2*+*DQGTXRWDLPSRUWLQ
WKHWKUHHVFHQDULRV0LOOLRQWRQQHV&2HTXLYDOHQWV
          No trade
 Annex II trade           Free trade
CO2 OGHG CO2 OGHG Quota import CO2 OGHG Quota import
USA 1406.3 71.0 1126.5 57.8 293.0 783.6 41.1 652.6
Canada 119.0 9.8 103.2 8.5 17.0 72.1 6.1 50.5
EU12* 313.0 25.8 600.2 46.0 -307.4 413.7 32.8 -107.7
Denmark 20.3 2.7 9.0 1.3 12.8 6.2 0.9 15.9
Finland 9.0 0.9 9.7 0.9 -0.8 6.7 0.7 2.4
Sweden 6.9 1.0 5.6 0.9 1.5 3.9 0.6 3.4
Norway 9.3 3.0 4.0 1.3 7.0 2.8 1.0 8.6
Other OECD 1.5 0.4 3.7 0.8 -2.6 2.6 0.6 -1.2
Russia -31.5 0.0 -33.2 0.0 0.0 286.0 35.2 -488.8
Other EIT 54.7 5.7 54.6 5.8 0.0 244.8 18.9 -203.2
Australia/N.Z. 24.8 4.5 96.9 14.6 -82.2 67.2 10.4 -48.2
Japan 233.8 4.4 173.1 3.3 61.7 120.2 2.4 115.6
Non Annex B**
-319.3 - -324.7 - - -298.4 - -
Sum 2167.2 129.2 2153.4 141.4 0.0 2009.7 150.6 0.0
* EU-15 minus Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
* No abatement is assumed to take place in the non-Annex B countries. The negative numbers in this row reflect
increased CO2-emissions in the region due to carbon leakage, i.e. increased use of fossil fuels because of the
price drops in the markets. The emissions of OGHG are not calculated for this region.
The Russian BAU-emissions in 2010 are assumed to be 7% lower than they were in 1990.
Since the Russian emission quota is equal to the 1990 emissions, we assume 167 million
tonnes ‘hot air’ from Russia measured in CO2 equivalents. There might turn out to be ‘hot air’
also in other EIT-countries, but this possibility is ruled out here due to both our assumptions
about BAU-emissions in 2010 and to the aggregation of the other EIT countries to one unit.
Three cases are analyzed. Firstly, we look at the case where no emission trading is allowed to
take place. Secondly, we look at the case where emission trading is free within Annex B
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while the EIT-countries are not allowed to take part in emission trading. Thirdly, we look at
the case where the Annex B countries are free to sell and buy quotas.
The distribution of the abatement efforts across the different gases and regions in the three
cases as well as the trade movements in the quota market are listed in table 2. One should
note that in the cases where the EIT-countries are not allowed to sell emission quotas, the
Russian emissions of CO2 are estimated to be 31-33 million tonnes higher than in BAU. This
is a sort of carbon leakage due to the price drop in the fossil fuel markets caused by the
abatement policies in the other Annex II countries. Such a leakage could take place because
the Russian emission target is assumed to be non-binding.
A more serious carbon leakage is likely to take place in the non-Annex B countries. This
carbon leakage is estimated to be around 14% of the total abatement within the Annex B
region and of approximately the same size as the total abatement within EU.
Table 2 shows also the different countries and regions import of emission quotas in the three
scenarios. Together with the EIT-countries the European Union are assumed to be the main
quota sellers when emission trading is free. The EU is however going to sell a larger amount
of quotas in the case with trade limited to the Annex II area due to the higher quota price in
this case. The USA is the main quota buyer because of the high-expected emission growth in
this country. In the case with trade only among the Annex II countries, the quota price is
estimated to be USD 30.4 pr. tonnes CO2 equivalent. In the case with free trade among the
Annex B countries, the quota price is estimated to be USD 21.6 pr. tonnes CO2 equivalent.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the calculated costs of the Kyoto Protocol. In these net-cost-
estimates both abatement costs, losses and gains from terms-of-trade changes and benefits
from revenue recycling are included. A first impression of the simulation is that the costs of
the assumed climate protocol are relatively low in most of the countries in question, even
without emission trading. We must here keep in mind that we deal with annual costs of
emission reductions. They will therefore constitute income losses that have to be taken into
account every year during the first commitment period.
According to the numerical examples, only Norway experiences net costs above 1% of the
GDP.  This is mainly explained by the oil and gas export from this country and the calculated
price drop especially in the oil market following from the implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol. Not least important in this respect is the fact that a large part of the profit in this
country’s oil and gas production is directly allocated into public budgets. Norway has
imposed especially high profit taxes in the petroleum-producing sector, but public income is
also generated through direct public ownership in the production of oil and gas. Reduced oil
prices in the world market will therefore bring about reduced public revenue in Norway and
hence force the Norwegian government to increase existing distortionary taxes.
Having a look at the scenario where emission trading is allowed, a noteworthy result is that
the EIT-countries and the non-Nordic EU countries will experience net gains from the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. As far as EU is concerned this is firstly explained by
the considerable terms-of-trade gains that EU will experience mainly as a result of the drop in
the oil price and the gas price. The second explanation, which also involves the EIT-
countries, is the inclusion of the income these countries receive from their participation in the
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quota market. According to the simulations the EIT-countries are the main quota sellers, but
also EU is selling quotas.
)LJXUH&RVWVRIWKH.\RWR3URWRFRO7KH(8GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQDJUHHGXSRQLQ-XQH
LVLQWHUQDOL]HG7HUPVRIWUDGHHIIHFWVDUHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW
According to the simulations also Sweden should expect a small net benefit from the Kyoto
Protocol. The main explanation is the burden-sharing rule within EU, which allows Sweden
to increase its emission from 1990 to the first commitment period by 4%. That implies an
emission reduction from the BAU-level of 11%. This number should be related to figure 1
and 2. From figure 2 we see that an emission reduction in Sweden of 11% implies abatement
costs below 0.15% of GDP. The Swedish costs are nevertheless significantly smaller due to
this country’s gains from lower fossil fuel prices.
Denmark is committed to reduce the emission to a level 21% below the 1990-level. With our
assumptions about the BAU-emissions in 2010 this implies an emission reduction from BAU
of 25% and consequently Denmark experiences higher abatement costs than Sweden and
Finland (emission reduction from BAU of 14%).
&RVWVDIWHUWHUPVRIWUDGHFKDQJHV
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The USA experiences also relatively high costs, especially when this country is not allowed to
buy quotas. Explanatory factors are the terms of trade changes and this country’s role in the
fossil fuel markets, as well as the expected BAU emission growth. The USA is a considerable
producer of oil, coal and gas. Hence, while Japan and the EU experience large terms of trade
gains due to price drops in the oil and coal markets, the US does not experience terms of trade
gains of the same order of magnitude.
)LJXUH&RVWVZKHQWKHWHUPVRIWUDGHHIIHFWVDUHQRWWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW
In both cases where emission trading is taking place, the USA is a buyer of quotas. In the case
where the EIT-countries are allowed to take part in the emission trading, the USA is buying
emission quotas equal to 12% of the initial number of quotas. Hence, the US emissions in that
case are estimated to be 4.6% higher in 2010 that they were in 1990.
Especially Denmark and Norway but also Canada, USA, Australia and the EIT countries will
receive significant benefits from emission trading. This is both related to especially high or
low abatement costs in these countries or high or low emission reduction requirements.
Countries with more average abatement cost patterns will not benefit to the same extent from
&RVWVEHIRUHWHUPVRIWUDGHFKDQJHV
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emission trading. The emission targets of Australia and Russia are for example likely to give
these countries the possibility to attain gains from quota sale.
Figure 4 shows the estimated costs when terms of trade changes are not taken into account.
This diagram constitutes a good starting point for increased understanding of the estimated
abatement costs in figure 3, which include terms of trade changes. The costs of the fossil fuel
exporters are reduced while the costs of the net importers are increased if we compare with
the costs including terms of trade changes. We should furthermore note that some countries
according to the numerical examples would experience net gains from the Kyoto Protocol
even when terms of trade changes are not taken into account. This is basically a result of
income from quota sales.
)LJXUH(VWLPDWHGSULFHFKDQJHVLQWKHIRVVLOIXHOPDUNHWV
Figure 5 provides an overview of the estimated price changes in the fossil fuel markets that
are likely to follow from the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. From a Norwegian point
of view it is interesting that free emission trading is likely to enhance the price drop in the
European gas market. The reason is the resulting redistribution of abatement efforts from
countries where gas consumption plays a minor role for the GHG-emissions, to countries
where combustion of natural gas is more important in this respect.
A result of the price drop in the fossil fuel markets is increased emissions of CO2 in the non-
Annex B countries, so-called carbon leakage, cf. table 2.
3ULFHGURSVLQWKHIRVVLOIXHOPDUNHWV
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 &RQFOXVLRQ
We have used a numerical model in order to provide an overview of the main economic
consequences of the Kyoto Protocol. The analysis and the model concept has given emphasis
to the inclusion of double dividends, or benefits from revenue recycling, in the abatement cost
estimates. Furthermore, it is given attention to the links between different countries’
abatement efforts and the equilibrium in:
• the three regional gas markets in North America, Europe and the Pacific region,
• the oil market,
• the market for quotas.
OPEC is assumed to behave strategically in the oil market.
We have analyzed three cases. In one case the possibility for emission trading was ruled out.
In a second case countries in transition to a market economy (the EIT-countries) were not
allowed to take part in the quota market. In the third case there was no restrictions on the
quota market. We compared the implementation costs in the three cases and the trade patterns
in the two last cases.
The analysis suggests that the EIT-countries will experience the largest benefits from
emission trading and will be dominant on the supply side in the market. USA will be a
dominant buyer of quotas, but will not to the same extent experience reduced implementation
costs. The inclusion of benefits from revenue recycling is crucial for this result. The
simulations indicate that the EU will not be an important participant in the quota market as
long as the EIT-countries are included in the market.
The simulations indicate furthermore that EU, due to price drops in the fossil fuel markets,
will experience negative net costs although not far from zero.
An interesting result, which should be further investigated and tested for robustness, is the
links between the price changes in the fossil fuel markets and the trade movements in the
quota market. The simulations indicate that emission trading leads to an enhanced price drop
in the European gas market, while the oil price reduction at the same time is decreased.
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$SSHQGL[$)RVVLOIXHOWD[HVLQDQGIRVVLOIXHOV
SURGXFWLRQDQGFRQVXPSWLRQSDWWHUQVLQWKH
%$8VFHQDULR
Production Consumption Taxes
(Mill. tonnes CO2) (Mill. tonnes CO2) (USD/tonnes CO2) *
Oil Coal Gas Oil Coal Gas Oil Coal Gas
USA 1655 2695 1131 3102 2311 1338 15.8 0.0 0.0
Canada 354 177 223 298 113 148 31.4 0.0 0.0
EU12 298 828 287 1745 1107 453 66.5 0.1 13.0
Denmark 2 0 0 34 27 5 82.1 25.9 0.0
Finland 0 0 0 42 15 6 41.8 2.2 2.2
Sweden 0 0 0 61 10 2 87.6 38.4 25.8
Norway 427 0 154 39 3 6 47.0 23.9 0.0
Other OECD 0 0 0 43 2 3 49.2 1.0 0.6
Russia 1548 639 1027 749 655 787 0.0 -1.0 -0.9
Other EIT 53 1030 182 455 954 400 0.0 -1.0 -0.9
Australia and
New Zealand
117 540 53 150 203 58 50.1 0.0 0.0
Japan 0 25 5 917 340 118 26.9 0.0 0.1
* The estimated average tax rates are taken from ECON (1995), which presents average fossil fuel taxes in the
OECD countries from 1980 to 1994. The tax rates presented there are based on weighting energy taxes by
product and sector. The information on taxes is based on IEA Energy Prices and Taxes. The information on
taxes has been supplemented with EU’s oil price statistics, ‘Oil Bulletin’ and with direct contact with national
administrations. The weights are based on ‘Basic Energy Statistics’. The Basic Energy Statistics have been
supplemented with oil industry information and EU statistics on the use of leaded and unleaded gasoline and on
the breakdown of heavy fuel oil according to sulphur content (relevant for countries differentiating heavy fuel oil
taxes according to sulphur content). The calculation of the average taxation by sector takes into account the
exempted use of energy within the sector. Concerning gasoline the taxes are for premium gasoline. Taxes for
leaded and unleaded gasoline (where relevant) have been weighted with the consumption of the two qualities.
For countries differentiating the tax between high and low sulphur, taxes are represented by the tax on the typical
quality in industry and power generation.
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